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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., (PGMex) appeals from 
an order for summary judgment entered in favor of Philadelphia 
Gear Corporation (PGC).  The case raises significant questions 
regarding recognition of foreign judicial proceedings which, in 
light of the anticipated increase in international commercial 
transactions in North America, likely will become of increasing 
significance.  Inasmuch as we decide this case on procedural 
grounds, we only need summarize the factual background of the 
case. 
 Pursuant to an agreement dated March 5, 1968 (the 
"basic agreement"), PGC and several Mexican investors formed 
Philadelphia Gear Mexicana (PGM), with PGC owning 49% and the 
Mexican investors owning 51%.  PGM had two purposes: (1) to 
manufacture PGC's products in Mexico; and (2) to sell PGC 
products in Mexico.  The basic agreement provided that the 
Mexican investors would manage PGM and that, pursuant to a 
separate technical assistance agreement, PGC would provide 
technical assistance and licensing to enable PGM to manufacture 
  
PGC's products.  The basic agreement was to last until 1999, and 
continue year-to-year thereafter. 
 The technical assistance agreement ("1968 technical 
agreement"), executed on March 15, 1968, provided, among other 
things that:  (1) PGC would train PGM's technical and sales 
personnel at PGC's plant in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania; 
(2) PGC would send engineers or technicians to supervise the 
installation of machinery and equipment in PGM's plant in Mexico; 
(3) PGC periodically would send qualified personnel to Mexico to 
assist PGM's manufacturing and selling; and (4) PGC periodically 
would supply PGM all available information and technical 
assistance required for the efficient manufacture and sale of the 
products covered by the agreement.  The 1968 technical agreement 
also granted PGM the exclusive right to use PGC's patents and 
trademarks in Mexico and provided that PGM would not have to pay 
a fee for the technical assistance so long as PGC remained a 49% 
shareholder in PGM. 
 Until 1973, PGM conducted its manufacturing and sales 
operation in a rented facility.  However, in 1973, two of the 
Mexican investors and PGC formed a Mexican corporation, MYB, S.A. 
(MYB), which constructed a manufacturing and sales facility in 
Mexico.  The Mexican investors owned 51% and PGC owned 49% in 
MYB.  In 1981, MYB changed its name to Philadelphia Gear de 
Mexico, S.A. (PGMex), and in 1987, PGM merged into PGMex, making 
it the sole surviving Mexican entity.  From 1968 through 1988, 
PGC and PGMex, including the latter's predecessors, executed 
various agreements governing their relationship.   
  
 In 1991, after a breakdown in their relationship, PGC 
filed a complaint against PGMex in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking a 
declaration that, because PGC properly terminated a May 1, 1990 
agreement ("1990 sales agreement") between PGC and PGMex, PGMex 
no longer had the right to use PGC's trademarks, to manufacture 
products from PGC's designs, to act as a PGC sales representative 
in Mexico, or to retain PGC's technical material.  In response, 
PGMex filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non 
conveniens which the district court denied.  PGMex then filed an 
answer alleging that the 1990 sales agreement did not govern the 
parties' relationship.  PGMex also filed a counterclaim in which 
it alleged that PGC breached its agreements with PGMex. 
 On July 20, 1993, PGC filed a motion for summary 
judgment both on its complaint and on PGMex's counterclaim and, 
on August 31, 1993, PGMex filed its opposition to the motion.  On 
October 6, 1993, while the motion still was pending, the district 
court received a Letter Rogatory from a Mexican court, requesting 
that the district court either stay the case or transfer it to 
Mexico.1  The Mexican court issued the letter at the request of 
PGMex which had instituted a suspension of payments proceeding in 
                     
1
.  PGMex recites in its brief that the Justice Department served 
the letter on the district court.  Appellant's br. at 5.  On the 
other hand, PGC indicates that the "Mexican Consulate" supplied 
the letter.  Appellee's br. at 5.  The parties, however, do not 
treat the method of service of the letter as significant on this 
appeal and thus we do not consider this discrepancy further, 
beyond noting that according to the district court's docket 
sheets, the consulate sent the letter to the court. 
  
the Mexican court pursuant to the Mexican Bankruptcy and 
Suspension of Payments Laws (MBSPL).2  PGC describes the 
suspension of payments proceeding as "somewhat analogous to 
Chapter 11" of the Bankruptcy Code.  App. at 1068.  PGMex accepts 
this description.  Appellants' br. at 39. 
 On November 19, 1993, PGC filed a brief in opposition 
to the relief sought in the Letter Rogatory along with an opinion 
of a Mexican attorney contending that the Letter Rogatory was 
ineffective.  On December 9, 1993, the district court entered 
summary judgment in PGC's favor on both the complaint and the 
counterclaim.  At that time the court filed a comprehensive 
opinion which explained why the court was granting summary 
judgment but which did not mention the Letter Rogatory.  On 
December 10, 1993, PGMex filed a brief in support of the Letter 
Rogatory with an opinion from a Mexican attorney asserting that 
the letter should be honored.  PGC then moved to amend the 
judgment in a manner not material to this opinion.  The district 
court granted that motion, vacated the judgment of December 9, 
1993, and entered an amended final judgment on January 19, 1994.  
PGMex has appealed from the judgment of January 19, 1994.3  PGMex 
challenges both the district court's refusal to extend comity to 
                     
2
.  We also note that in Remington Rand v. Business Sys. Inc., 
830 F.2d 1260, 1262 (3d Cir. 1987), we indicated that a 
suspension of payment proceeding in the Netherlands was "the 
Dutch equivalent of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code." 
3
.  PGMex appealed from the judgment entered December 9, 1993, 
but filed an amended notice of appeal after the district court 
entered its amended judgment. 
  
the Mexican court proceedings and its grant of summary judgment 
to PGC. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), as PGC is incorporated in the 
United States, PGMex is a Mexican corporation, and the amount in 
controversy exceeds $50,000.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as PGMex appeals from a final judgment. 
 
 II.  DISCUSSION 
 The initial, and indeed in light of our conclusions, 
the only issue we consider on this appeal is whether the district 
court abused its discretion by not granting the request in the 
Letter Rogatory that the court stay this case or transfer it to 
the Mexican court.  Because we find that the district court 
abused its discretion by the procedure it followed in failing to 
execute the Letter Rogatory, we will not reach the merits of 
PGMex's appeal from the summary judgment.  Instead, we will 
vacate the order for summary judgment without prejudice and 
remand this matter for further proceedings. 
 As we have indicated, the district court received the 
Letter Rogatory while the motion for summary judgment was 
pending.  Yet, neither in its opinion granting the summary 
judgment, nor in any other opinion, did the district court 
express its reasons for declining to execute the Letter Rogatory.  
While PGC argues that the district court was not obliged to 
execute the letter and "[s]urely . . . considered the timing" of 
the letter's service in not honoring it, in fact we only can 
  
guess as to the court's reasoning.  Appellee's br. at 39 n.6.  
Furthermore, the court granted PGC's motion for summary judgment, 
thus implicitly declining to recognize the Letter Rogatory, 
before PGMex filed its brief in support of the letter.  We thus 
make our analysis without knowing the reason for the court's 
refusal to honor the letter. 
 In general, "[u]nder the principle of international 
comity, a domestic court normally will give effect to executive, 
legislative, and judicial acts of a foreign nation."  Remington 
Rand v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1266 (3d Cir. 1987).  
More specifically, we have stated that "[c]omity should be 
withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or 
prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it 
effect."  Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 
F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) (citations and footnote omitted), 
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017, 92 S.Ct. 1294 (1972).  Thus, a court 
may, within its discretion, deny comity to a foreign judicial act 
if it finds that the extension of comity "would be contrary or 
prejudicial to the interest of the" United States. 
 Accordingly, we review "the extension or denial of 
comity . . . by the abuse of discretion standard."  Remington, 
830 F.2d at 1266 (citations omitted).  Consequently, when 
reviewing a denial of comity, we must determine whether a 
district court acted within its discretion if it concluded that 
"acceptance [of comity] would be prejudicial to the interest of 
the" United States.  Therefore, inasmuch as we do not know why 
the court exercised its discretion as it did or, indeed, whether 
  
it even recognized that it had discretion in considering whether 
to recognize the Mexican proceedings, unless we conclude that 
comity should have been denied as a matter of law we are 
constrained to remand this case to the district court to make 
appropriate findings.4 
 In making our inquiry into whether the letter could be 
rejected as a matter of law, we initially recognize that PGMex 
did not make a formal motion for a stay or transfer pursuant to 
the letter.  We have found no case law dealing with whether 
comity can be granted to a foreign judicial act in the absence of 
a motion by a party to extend comity.  This is perhaps not 
surprising as normally when a court decides whether to grant 
comity to a foreign judicial act, it rules in response to a 
motion by a litigant for a stay pending disposition of the 
foreign action.5   
                     
4
.  We do not mean to suggest that in every circumstance in which 
a district court exercises discretion it must explain the basis 
for its actions.  Rather, we address only the situation before 
us.  We are not distinguishing between state and federal law 
regarding comity, as the parties do not make any such distinction 
in their briefs.  There may, however, be a distinction and the 
parties are free to address this issue on remand.  We do observe 
that in this diversity action Pennsylvania law with respect to 
the substantive comity issues may apply but we do not reach that 
unbriefed issue.  See Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440; Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Group v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1985). 
5
.  For example, in Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group Ltd., 
994 F.2d 996, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 386 (1993),  
Allstate brought suit against, among others, a group of 
Australian corporations, alleging that the corporations violated 
United States securities laws.  A month later, the corporations 
"were placed in liquidation by orders of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales."  The corporations and other defendants "moved to 
dismiss or stay the action on the basis of the ongoing 
liquidation proceeding in Australia."  Allstate, 994 F.2d at 998.  
  
 Nevertheless, we conclude that the fact that PGMex did 
not make such a motion does not compel the conclusion that the 
district court should not have extended comity to the Mexican 
proceedings.  In fact, we conclude that whatever might be true in 
other cases, the absence of a formal motion does not matter in 
this case.  Our primary reason for this conclusion is that the 
Letter Rogatory served the same procedural function as a motion, 
as it informed the district court and the parties what relief was 
sought.  Furthermore, the Mexican court had an institutional 
interest in having its proceedings recognized, as they are 
similar to Chapter 11 proceedings.  Moreover, the district court, 
after receiving the letter, was free to set a briefing and/or 
hearing schedule for resolution of the issues raised by the 
letter.  Finally, PGMex in effect did move to enforce the Letter 
Rogatory when it filed its brief in support of it.6  While we do 
not suggest that a request in a brief always can be so treated, 
in this case we regard PGMex's brief as the functional equivalent 
of a motion.  The totality of these circumstances convinces us 
that we should consider the comity issue on the same basis we 
would if PGMex had moved for the stay. 
(..continued) 
The district court "granted defendants' motion to dismiss, on the 
ground of comity, in favor of the ongoing liquidation proceeding 
in Australia."  Id.  The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning 
that the appellants' claims could be resolved in the Australian 
liquidation proceeding and dismissal would not violate United 
States law or policy.  Id. at 998-99. 
  
6
.  In its brief, PGMex indicates that the brief it filed in the 
district court on December 10, 1993, was timely under the rules 
of the district court.  PGC does not dispute this point in its 
brief. 
  
 We next consider PGC's argument that "[n]either the 
voluminous Letter Rogatory nor PGMex provided the District Court 
with the information necessary to warrant an extension of 
comity."  Appellee's br. at 40.  In other words, PGC is 
suggesting that, as a matter of law, PGMex did not present a 
prima facie case for the extension of comity to the letter.  This 
implies that we should find the letter facially ineffective.  If 
we found that PGMex did not present a prima facie case for the 
extension of comity, we would affirm the district court's denial 
of comity. 
 We have stated that "[c]reditors of an insolvent 
foreign corporation may be required to assert their claims 
against a foreign bankrupt before a duly convened foreign 
bankruptcy tribunal."  Remington, 830 F.2d at 1271 (citing Cunard 
S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Serv. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 458-59 (2d Cir. 
1985)).  In Remington, we had to determine, among other issues, 
whether the district court violated the principles of 
international comity by ordering a Dutch corporation, subject to 
a suspension of payments proceeding in the Netherlands, to turn 
over proprietary documents to a United States corporation and to 
account for proceeds it wrongfully obtained through the use of 
the materials.  Remington, 830 F.2d at 1267.  In addressing this 
issue, we cited the general comity principles that we set forth 
in Somportex: 
Comity is a recognition which one nation extends 
within its own territory to the legislative, 
executive, or judicial acts of another.  It is not 
a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, 
and expediency.  Although more than mere courtesy 
  
and accommodation, comity does not achieve the 
force of an imperative or obligation.  Rather, it 
is a nation's expression of understanding which 
demonstrates due regard both to international duty 
and convenience and to the rights of persons 
protected by its own laws.  Comity should be 
withheld only when its acceptance would be 
prejudicial to the interest of the nation called 
upon to give it effect. 
Remington, 830 F.2d at 1267 (quoting Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440). 
 Additionally, Remington set forth the comity 
considerations that apply specifically "[i]n the foreign 
bankruptcy context."  Remington, 830 F.2d at 1267-68.  More 
specifically, Remington recognized two competing policies in 
considering extending comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding.  
First, when the foreign bankruptcy court shares our "fundamental 
principle that assets be distributed equally among creditors of 
similar standing," we should be inclined to extend comity.  
Remington, 830 F.2d at 1271 (citations omitted).  On the other 
hand, federal courts must be careful not to force "American 
creditors to participate in foreign proceedings in which their 
claims will be treated in some manner inimical this country's 
policy of equality."  Id. (citations omitted).  See also Republic 
of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., No. 93-5672, 
slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 1994) ("principles of comity 
cannot compel a domestic court to uphold foreign interests at the 
expense of the public policies of the forum state"). 
 Thus, Remington instructs that courts, when deciding 
whether to extend comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings by 
staying a case before it, should ascertain whether the foreign 
  
bankruptcy court is a duly authorized tribunal, whether the 
foreign bankruptcy law shares our policy of equal distribution of 
assets, and whether forcing the United States creditor to 
prosecute its claim in the foreign court would be "in some manner 
inimical to this country's policy of equality."  Drawing on 
Remington, we conclude that a party seeking a stay of a judicial 
proceeding in this country based on a foreign bankruptcy 
proceeding must demonstrate the following: (1) the foreign 
bankruptcy court shares our policy of equal distribution of 
assets; and (2) the foreign law mandates the issuance or at least 
authorizes the request for the stay.  If the party urging that 
comity be afforded the foreign proceedings makes such a prima 
facie showing, the district court should consider the matter 
further and should not dismiss the request out of hand without 
explaining its ruling.  In this process it may be necessary for 
the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing with expert testimony 
to ascertain foreign law and procedures.  These matters, after 
all, may be in dispute, as they are here.  See Grupo Protexa, 
S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, 20 F.3d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 481 (1994); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group 
Inc. v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1985). 
  Accordingly, we now evaluate whether PGMex presented a 
prima facie case for a stay.  As to the first element, PGMex 
presented an opinion from a Mexican attorney, stating that under 
the MBSPL "[t]he obligation to present all claims against the 
common debtor is based on the principle to preserve the company 
and its possessions which should not be distributed in prejudice 
  
of all creditors, and in other principle based on the 
universality and territoriality of the suspension of payments and 
the equitable treatment of all creditors."  App. at 1105 
(emphasis deleted).  While this statement is not completely free 
from ambiguity, the attorney seems to be stating that under the 
MBSPL, all creditors are treated equally.  Accordingly, we 
believe that this statement demonstrates that the foreign 
bankruptcy court shares our policy of equal distribution of 
assets. 
 As to the second element, the attorney's opinion stated 
that Article 409 of the MBSPL mandates the stay of the district 
court proceeding.  While the attorney acknowledged that there are 
exceptions to the stay provisions, we understand his opinion to 
state that the exceptions are not applicable here.  Accordingly, 
PGMex presented a prima facie case that Mexican law mandates a 
stay of the district court proceedings.  While PGC presented a 
legal opinion which differs from that submitted by PGMex, at this 
stage of the proceedings in which we are concerned only with 
whether PGMex has presented a prima facie case, we have no need 
to describe that opinion in detail.   
 In sum, we therefore hold that inasmuch as the Letter 
Rogatory was properly before the district court, and PGMex 
presented a prima facie case for a stay of the district court 
proceedings based on according comity to the Mexican proceedings, 
the district court abused its discretion when it granted summary 
judgment without even discussing the letter or making any factual 
findings on the comity issue.  See Drexel Burnham Lambert, 777 
  
F.2d at 881 ("We conclude that the facts relating to the Dubai 
proceedings and its consonance with domestic law and public 
policy were sufficiently in dispute to warrant further 
inquiry.").  While the district court might have been able to 
articulate a reason for its actions, it did not do so.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the order for summary judgment and 
will remand the case to the district court.  On remand, the 
district court should determine whether according comity to the 
Mexican proceedings "would be prejudicial to the interest of the" 
United States.  In making that inquiry, the court should assess, 
along with any other issues it finds relevant, the following 
issues: (1) whether the Mexican court in which the proceedings 
are pending is a duly authorized tribunal; (2) whether the MBSPL 
provides for equal treatment of creditors; (3) whether a stay 
would be "in some manner inimical to this country's policy of 
equality"; and (4) whether PGC will be prejudiced by the stay.7  
In the event that the court denies comity, it may reconsider the 
motion for summary judgment or take such further proceedings as 
are then appropriate. 
 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of January 19, 
1994, is vacated and the matter is remanded to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                     
7
.  Conceivably, on remand the district court might conclude that 
it should transfer the proceedings to the Mexican court.  We do 
not reach that issue and thus express no opinion on the point. 
  
            
 
 
  
 _________________________________________________ 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: No. 94-1054 
 Although I share the majority's view that the district 
court should have articulated its reasons for denying the Letter 
Rogatory's request for comity, I reach a different decision as to 
the action we should take in view of the district court's failure 
to rule on comity.  I base my conclusion on a combination of a 
desire for judicial economy and a determination, from the record 
before us, that it would have been inappropriate to grant the 
Letter Rogatory, extending comity to the Mexican bankruptcy 
court.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 In reaching this conclusion, I, too, place great 
emphasis on Remington Rand v. Business Systems, Inc., 830 F.2d 
1260 (3d Cir. 1987).  Yet, my reading of Remington does not lead 
to the broad view of comity advocated by the majority.  In 
Remington, our pronouncements on the importance of comity are 
specifically confined to the district court's attempt to attach 
foreign assets: 
 
To the extent that the district court order seeks to 
attach BSI assets in the United States, it will not be 
disturbed.  No international trappings surround the 
district court's imposition of a constructive trust 
over assets located in the United States.  We see no 
aspects of comity implicated here.  The same is not 
true, however, insofar as the attachment of foreign 
assets is concerned.  We believe that before that 
  
aspect of the judgment can be sustained, certain 
conditions precedent . . . must first be satisfied. 
Id. at 1272.  Importantly, the doctrine of comity did not prevent 
the Court in Remington from affirming certain decisions reached 
by the district court, including the district court's findings 
that BSI had misappropriated trade secrets and that BSI must 
return certain confidential "know how" documents to Remington 
U.S.  These decisions were upheld, even though there is no 
indication in Remington that the district court specifically 
indicated why it chose to decide these matters rather than defer 
to the bankruptcy proceeding simultaneously underway in The 
Netherlands.   
 In my view, the issues argued on summary judgment in 
the instant matter resemble the issues that were not precluded by 
considerations of comity in Remington.  Specifically, PGC seeks a 
declaratory judgment on PGMex's rights to use PGC's trademarks 
and technical material, to manufacture products from PGC's 
designs, and to act as PGC's sales representative in Mexico.  
Because such a determination does not implicate assets held by 
PGMex in Mexico, the district court's action does not affect the 
ability of a Mexican bankruptcy court to effectively distribute 
PGMex's assets to its creditors.  Accordingly, the district court 
would not have abused its discretion if it had decided that 
comity did not preclude it from deciding the merits of the 
parties' summary judgment motions. 
  
 Additionally, concerns for judicial economy weigh 
against remanding the matter without reaching the merits on 
appeal.  The district court's grant of summary judgment was the 
focus of the briefing and argument before this Court.  We are 
familiar with the issues, and they are ripe for a decision. 
 Because we can decide these issues, because comity 
should not, under Remington, preclude us from deciding them, and 
because judicial resources would not best be served by simply 
vacating summary judgment without deciding the issues, I conclude 
that we should rule on the district court's grant of summary 
judgment.  My review of the parties' motions for summary judgment 
reveals that numerous issues of material fact exist, including 
whether the parties orally modified their sales and technical 
agreements at the September 24, 1990 meeting.  Accordingly, I 
would reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of PGC on its declaratory judgment complaint and its grant 
of summary judgment against PGMex on its counterclaims, and I 
would remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings.   
  
